CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION


§ 23. THE RULE OF REASON


In the foregoing pages we have analyzed the various grounds upon which intervention may justly be under taken to defend international law rights either by way of interposition or international police. We have attempted to draw the line between the due exercise of sovereignty which the law of nations recognizes and the abusive insistence upon independent action without consideration of the equally important rights of other states and the interests of the common weal. Whether the state is acting in the defense of a recognized right or in pursuit of its interests, there is no absolute or perfect right, but all rights are to be asserted with due regard to the preservation of the independence, security, and prosperity of neighboring states. Rights which have been given for the common good of all the states may not be perverted to menace international security.

Finally as a result of our investigation of what we may call rights in political action, we laid down a rule of the broadest application: that the employment of force under international law, whether it be to defend rights or to protect and foster interests, is always limited by the condition that there shall first have been made a reasonable effort to reach an amicable adjustment.

It remains for us to define what effort is "reasonable."

Every state we have seen has a sovereign right to decide when its rights are menaced and when its vital interests are in jeopardy. If it were likewise at liberty immediately to employ its force upon the warrant of this sovereign determination, there would be no security for any state and international law would be an empty word.

To keep within the bounds of law every state that employs its might to defend its rights or to protect its interests against the abusive insistence upon alleged right by another must first justify its action before its sister states; it must second observe all the delays and forms of procedure customary in international practice; and it must third - outwardly at least - evince a disposition to adopt any suggestion or compromise which gives promise of a peaceful solution without sacrificing its own important interests or the means to enforce them.

In each one of these steps the state itself has in first instance the sovereign right to decide whether it has fulfilled the law, but at each step also the family of states are free - nay they are bound - in as far as the circumstances will permit, to correct any erroneous or unjust decision.

In international society, as in every society which is at the stage of self-execution, there must always be such an appeal from the subjective (sovereign) decision of the individual state judging the rectitude of its own conduct to the forum of general public opinion - to the consensus of opinion of all the states. In this manner the application of the law of intervention is guided by the opinion of all of the states fixing the limits of the reasonable discretion which each state may enjoy in acting for the defense of its own rights and interests. This builds the whole system of international law upon the foundation of what the consensus of the states judge to be reasonable under the rule of reason.

In those questions where there is no consensus of opinion but only opposing views supported by forces approximately equal, there can be no rule of law. The nations are then not ready to recognize the opinion of either group as the rule of law. They must muddle along by some half-way measure. The states must expect to accept some compromise to govern each of such differences as it arises or to try a temporary expedient until such time as the partisans of the opposed views are better informed as to the limits of their rights and as to the relation of the forces with which the opposing opinions can be sustained. Upon this basis of appeal to the tribunal of international reason as interpreted and supported by the consensus of opinion in a preponderating majority of the states, the just peace of nations rests. Upon this basis the majority of the states do in ultimate analysis insist that the law of nations be observed. In those other non-legal or extra-legal relations which are designated as political, there is likewise a supreme and guiding - one might better say limiting - rule of law to guide state action: namely that every state shall evince a broad spirit of tolerance - an attitude of live and let live. This guiding rule may be formulated, as we have seen above, as the legal obligation that states in their political controversies shall observe - the rule which enjoins upon them to agree to a reasonable compromise of their differences.

If we have succeeded in defining the legal grounds of intervention, including that of intervention justified upon the ground of the refusal to agree to a reasonable adjustment or compromise, we have made it possible for the enlightened public opinion of the states concerned and of the whole world to support the governments that reasonably observes the law.

For generations it has been the custom of governments to justify their recourse to force before their nationals, and it will be no small guarantee of the observance of the law when governments understand that their explanations and excuses must stand the test of reason - by which is meant unprejudiced examination of the alleged grounds of action in all the states of the world. Today when the nations are so dependent one upon the other, and when all recognize the importance of insisting upon the respect for the law of nations, states will be quicker to intervene in vindication of their law than formerly they were. The motive-spring of this salutary action will ever remain enlightened public opinion in each state. As long as public opinion has this directing influence, the citizen himself must assume his part of the responsibility for the faithful observance of international law. To meet this responsibility fully he must be ready to commend his government for its just action, to condemn it for its violations of international law, and to lend his support for the adoption of a policy of enlightened self-interest which neither sacrifices essential interests to quixotic and ill-balanced impulses, nor yet is unmindful of the common interest of all the states to maintain peace and to preserve the health and rightful independence of each of the states separately; so that all humanity may continue uninterruptedly its march toward the goal anticipated by the poet:


Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer, and the battle-flags

were furl'd

In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.

----------------

There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm

in awe,

And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.



FOOTNOTES:

1 The following works contain bibliographies or bibliographical notes:

Berner in Bluntschli's Staatsworterbuch, 1860, Vol. V, p. 354. Has some valuable comments.

Bernard, 1860; Non-intervention, p. 10 note.

Hodges, H. F.; Intervention, p. 263-71. Incomplete and not important.

Geffcken, in Hollzendorff 's Handbuch, Vol. IV, p. 131.

Kraus, H.: Die Monroedoktrin, p. 369 note (1) has references on intervention. Kraus gives other bibliographical notes of value.

Library of Congress typewritten list on Intervention. This is the most complete list which has appeared to date, but it lacks a number of important works not yet to be found in the Library of Congress collection, and it makes no comment upon the merits of the respective works.

Library of Congress has also printed Bibliographies containing lists on Mediation, Balance of Power, etc. Oppenheim, L.: International Law. Second Edition, Vol. I, p. 188, 3d ed., Vol. I, p. 221.

Rivier, A.: Droit des Gens, Vol. I, 389-404.

Rotteek, H. von: Recht des Einmischung, 1845, p. 7-8, note. One of the best bibliographies.



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